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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN FEDERAL-MUNICIPAL
RELATIONSHIPS *
E. H. FOLEY, JR.t
It is a common practice in business to take inventory at least once a
year in order to see what there is on hand, what has been disposed of, and
what should be the future course of action. This practice of stock-taking
may well be carried over into the field of law. The attention recently given
by Congress to the problems of cities and other local political subdivisions
makes the subject of federal-municipal relations a timely one for treatment.
This coupling of the time and the subject is not a mere coincidence.
It is, rather, the consequence of a series of events which were destined
slowly but steadily to lead to a result which has been characterized by some
as a breakdown of states rights and by others as a natural by-product of
changing economic conditions.
The very concept of federal-municipal relations provokes thought. To
many people certainly, it may sound strange to speak of federal-municipal
relations when we are operating under a dual form of government controlled
by a Constitution which contains not a word about municipalities.
To grasp the significance of the recent changes in non-federal relationships with the Federal Government, it is necessary to see what has taken
place in the field of federal-local cooperation. The most familiar aspect of
this cooperation and the one which comes first to mind is, of course, the
cooperation between the Federal Government and the states themselves.
Federal Aid to the States
From the very first Congress in 1790 when the Hamilton-sponsored
Assumption Act was enacted,' providing for the assumption by the Federal
Government of state debts incurred during the Revolution, to the recent
session of Congress, we have witnessed the exercise of federal functions in
cooperation with those of the states. The acts of Congress providing for
cooperation with the states are so extensive that a mere citation of the principal ones covered more than eight printed pages in one of the briefs filed
by the Government in the Supreme Court of the United States last spring.2
* Based on a paper prepared for delivery before the Section of Municipal Law of the
American Bar Association at its annual meeting in Kansas City, September 28, 1937.
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Counsel, Treasury Department; author of Low-Rent Housing and State Financing (1937) 85
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i STAT. 138 (1790).
2. Pages 9o to 98 of Brief for Federal Emergency Administrator of Public Works in
Duke Power Co. v. Greenwood County, 299 U. S. 259 (1936). For a discussion of the problems of federal-aid administration see KaY, THE ADmiNisTRATIOI OF FEDRAL. GRANTS TO
STATES (1937).
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Liberal grants of federal funds have been made regularly to the states for
purposes of agricultural experimentation,8 vocational education 4 and rehabilitation,5 maternity and infancy hygiene, 6 highway construction,7 national
guard,' forest fire prevention 9 and education. 10
Two aspects of federal-state cooperation deserve brief treatment. One
deals with the results 11 and the other with the constitutionality of such a
venture. About ten years ago, a Committee of the National Municipal
League on Federal Aid to the States 12 summarized these results in seven
points, as follows:
(i) Federal aid has stimulated state activity;
(2) Federal aid has raised state standards;
(3) Federal aid has been consistently administered without unreasonable federal interference in state affairs;
(4) Federal aid has accomplished results without standardizing state
activities;
(5) Federal administration of the subsidy laws has been uninfluenced
by partisan politics;
(6) Federal aid has mitigated some of the most disastrous effects of
state politics; and, finally,
(7) Federal aid has placed no unreasonable burden on any section of
the country.
3. Beginning with the SMITH-LEvER ACT, 38 STAT. 372 (1914), 7 U. S. C. A. §§ 341-348
(1927).
4. Beginning with the SMITH-HUGHES AT, 39 STAT. 929 (1917), 20 U. S. C. A. §§ I-28
(1927).
5. Beginning with the FEss-KENYON ACT, 41 STAT. 735 (1920), 29 U. S. C. A. §§31-44
(1927).
6. Beginning with the SiiEPARD-TowNER AcT, 42 STAT. 224 (1921), 42 U. S. C. A.
§§ 161-174 (1928).
7. Beginning with the FEDERAL Am RoD AcT, 39 STAT. 355 (196), 16 U. S. C. A. § 503
(1927).
8. Beginning with the DicK LAw, 32 STAT. 775 (1903), 32 U. S. C. A. § 11 (1928), but
substantially overhauled by the NATIONAL DEFENSE ACT, 39 STAT. 197 (igi6), 32 U. S. C. A.
§1 (1928).

9. Beginning with the WEEKS ACT, 36 STAT. 961 (1911), I6 U. S. C. A. §§ 552, 563
(1927).

io. Particularly, the first MoRRmL ACT, 12 STAT. 5o3 (1862), 7 U. S. C. A. § 301 (1927);
the HATCH ACT, 24 STAT. 44o (1887), 7 U. S. C. A. § 362 (1927) ; the second MoRRiu. AT,
26 STAT. 417 (1890), 7 U. S. C. A. § 322 (1927) ; and the ADAms ACT, 34 STAT. 63 (i9o6),

7 U. S. C. A. §§ 369, 375 (1927).

ii. See MAcDoNALD, FEDERAL Am (1928) for a detailed discussion of the history and
results of the American subsidy system. Federal grants-in-aid to the states should be distinguished from state grants-in-aid to local subdivisions. For a discussion of the latter type
of aid, see HINCKLEY, STATE GRANTS-IN-AID (N. Y. State Tax Comm., Spec. Rep. No. 9,
1935).

For a discussion of the increased state dictation in local fiscal matters, see Jones,

Effect of the Depression on State-Local Relations (1936) 25 NAT. MUNIC. REV. 465.
12. FederalAid to the States (1928) 17 NAT. MuNIC. REv. 619 (Report of the Committee
on Federal Aid to the States of the National Municipal League).
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As to the constitutional question involved in the type of federal-state aid
here discussed, no serious issues may now be raised. Ever since the cases of
Frothinghamv. Mellon and Massachusetts v. Mellon, disposed of together
by the United States Supreme Court, 13 the issue has been clear that the policy
of federal aid to the states is constitutional. Those cases arose under the
Sheppard-Towner Act,14 which provided for federal aid to the states in
reducing maternal and infant mortality and in protecting the health of
mothers and infants. The Frothinghamcase was instituted by a resident of
Massachusetts and involved a suit to prevent the enforcement of the Act on
the ground that the effect of the appropriation would be to increase the
burden of future taxation and thereby confiscate plaintiff's property without
due process of law. The Court disposed of this contention by pointing out
that Mrs. Frothingham's interest in the moneys of the Treasury was shared
"with millions of others; is comparatively minute and indeterminable; and
the effect upon future taxation, of any payment of the funds, so remote,
fluctuating and uncertain, that no basis is afforded for an appeal to the
preventive powers of a court of equity." 15
The issues presented by the case in which the Commonwealth challenged
the constitutionality of the Act were just as readily dismissed. Massachusetts raised the much more serious point that federal aid was a means of
inducing the states to yield their sovereign rights. The Court disposed of
the case for want of jurisdiction on the ground that the question was a
political one and, therefore, was not a "matter which admits of the exercise
of the judicial power." 16 The Court's method of dismissing the state's
argument that the Act was within the field of local powers exclusively
reserved to the states was simplicity itself. If, reasoned the Court, Congress
adopted the Act "with the ulterior purpose" of tempting the states to yield,
"that purpose may be effectively frustrated by the simple expedient of not
yielding." 17
Federal Services to Municipalities
It must not be presumed that the recent development of federal aid to
municipalities has been sudden. Nor is it true that the policy of such aid to
the states has been discontinued in favor of direct federal aid to the cities.
Not only has federal-state cooperation in the past few years continued, but
direct federal cooperation with cities, which commenced on a small scale
several decades ago, has gradually developed to the point where it now
assumes major proportions.
13.262 U.

S. 447 (1922).

14. 42 STAT. 224 (1921), 42 U. S. C. A. § I6I
15. 262 U. S. 447, 487 (7922).
6. Id. at 483.
17. Id. at 482.

et seq. (1928).
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The National Bureau of Standards, the Bureau of Air Commerce, the
Coast and Geodetic Survey, the Bureau of Fisheries, the Bureau of Foreign
and Domestic Commerce, the Bureau of the Census and the Bureau of
Marine Inspection and Navigation of the Department of Commerce; the
Bureau of Agricultural Economics, the Bureau of Animal Industry, the
Bureau of Biological Survey, the Bureau of Chemistry and Soils, the Bureau
of Dairy Industry, the Food and Drug Administration, the Forest Service,
the Bureau of Home Economics, the Bureau of Plant Industry, and the
Bureau of Public Roads of the Department of Agriculture; the Office of
Education, the Geological Survey, the General Land Office, the Bureau of
Mines, and the Bureau of Reclamation of the Department of the Interior;
the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the Department of Justice; the United
States Employment Service, the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the Children's
Bureau, the Women's Bureau and the Immigration and Naturalization Service of the Department of Labor; the Public Health Service and the Coast
Guard of the Treasury Department; the Office of the Chief of Engineers of
the War Department; and the Civil Service Commission, the Library of
Congress and the Interstate Commerce Commission-by way of exampleall have been engaged in rendering services, in some form or other, to municipalities.' 8 So wide has been the range of activities of the Federal Government affecting municipal administration, that in 193 1 there was recommended
the establishment in the National Government of a Bureau of Municipal
Information "to function as a clearing house of information on all things
municipal in the Federal Government".1 9 It is interesting to note that a
similar recommendation was incorporated in a report of the National Re20
sources Committee recently made public.

One authority has ventured to say that prior to 1932, with one or two
possible exceptions, no mention of city appeared in the statutes of the United
States.2 1 It is indeed a curious commentary on our constitutional system
of government that this should be true in the face of the scores of services
which the Federal Government has been rendering to cities.
But all this has changed-and changed in no unmistakable terms. 22

It is in order, therefore, to summarize some of the statutes which reflect this
change. 23
I8. For a detailed description of these and other federal services to municipalities, see

BETTERS, FEDERAL SERVICES TO MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENTS (Munic. Adm'n Serv. No. 24,
1931).

ig. Id. at 3.

20. OUR CITIES, THEIR ROLE IN THE NATIONAL ECONOMY (Rep. of the Urbanism Comm.
to the Nat. Resources Comm. 1937) 10.

21. Wallerstein, Federal-MunicipalRelations-Whither Bound (1936) 25 NAT. MUNIC.
REV. 453.
22. For a discussion of the effect of this change on states, see Graves, The Future of the
American States (1936) 30 Am. POL. Sci. REV. 24.
23. General interest in this changed relationship is reflected in the extensive literature
on this subject. The interest of the municipalities themselves, naturally, is great and finds
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An examination of recent federal acts relating to municipalities will
disclose that in general they fall into three broad categories with, of course,
some degree of overlapping. There are, in the first place, those acts which
may be termed enabling, which authorize certain positive action; those which
may be termed preferential, which afford benefits to public bodies not generally afforded to others; and those which may be termed exemptive, which
exclude public bodies from their effect.
Enabling Legislation
The first of the recent acts to establish direct relationship between the
Federal Government and the cities was the Emergency Relief and Construction Act of 1932.24 Section 201 (a) (i) of that Act authorized the
Reconstruction Finance Corporation 25 "to make loans to, or contracts with,
states, municipalities, and political subdivisions of States, public agencies
of States, of municipalities, and of political subdivisions of States, public corporations, boards and commissions, and public municipal instrumentalities of one or more States, to aid in financing projects authorized
under Federal, State, or municipal law, which are self-liquidating in
." 26 It can be seen at a glance how the federal-city relacharacter...
tionship under this Act differs from the type of relationship afforded by the
federal services to cities. It is the difference between the Bureau of Mines
making available to cities a pamphlet on "What is Known About the Effect
of Smoke on Health" and the Reconstruction Finance Corporation lending $71,000,000 to build the San Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge, the obligations evidencing the loan being payable from the tolls collected for the
use of the bridge. They are both services, to be sure; but they illustrate
opposite extremes in this important field.
The Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933 27 does not sound like one which
would particularly benefit city treasuries, yet it has proved to be an effective
step to rehabilitate city finances by the simple expedient of authorizing a
home owner to borrow from the Home Owners' Loan Corporation to pay
taxes. 28 As a result of this provision, by 1936 one dollar out of every
expression in the attention given the subject in: The Federal Government and the Cities
(I934) 1 MUNIc. YEAR BooK 33; Federal-City Relations (1936) 3 id. at 154; Federal-City
Relations it 1936 (1937) 4 id. at 145. General discussions of this subject include: Dodds,
Federal Aid for the City (935) 25 YALE REV. 96; Merriam, The Federal Government Recognizes the Cities (1934) 23 NAT. MuNIc. REV. 107; Reinhold, Federal-MunicipalRelations
-The Road Thus Far (1936) 25 id. at 452; Williams, The Status of Cities under Recent
Federal Legislation (I936) 30 Am. POL. Sci. REV. 1107; Williams, Municipal Problems Facing the 75th Congress (1936) 25 NAT. MuIc. REV. 641. The most detailed treatment of this
subject appears in BETTERs, RECENT FEDERA1.-CiTy RELATIONS (1936).
24. 47 STAT. 709 (1932), 15 U. S. C. A. § 6o5a (Supp. 1937).
25. Created by 47 STAT. 5 (1932), 15 U. S. C. A. § 6oi (Supp. 1937).
26. 47 STAT. 711 (1932), 15 U. S. C. A. § 6o5b (i) (Supp. 1937).
27. 48 STAT. 128 (933), 12 U. S. C. A. § 1461 (1936).
28. Id. at 13o, 12 U. S. C. A. § 1463 (d) (2).
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fifteen lent by the Home Owners' Loan Corporation found its way to local
2
treasuries in urban areas.

9

Of considerable assistance to municipalities has been the Banking Act
of 1933,30 pursuant to which the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
was set up. Offering the same protection to municipal funds as it does to
private funds, the Corporation has been of value to many municipalities,
particularly the smaller ones whose deposits do not normally exceed the
$5,ooo limit of protection.
Federal-city relationship as evidenced by the Works Progress Administration 31 is too familiar to require any extended discussion. Almost entirely financed by the Federal Government, thousands of projects were undertaken upon application to the Works Progress Administration by states,
cities and other political subdivisions. The activities of the Works Progress Administration indubitably constitute an important contribution to
the material on recent federal-municipal relationiships.3 2
Two statutes adopted in 1936 authorized loans to municipalities. The
Rural Electrification Act of 1936 3 authorizes the making of loans to
finance the construction of rural electric distribution systems. Under this
Act loans may be made to persons, corporations, states, territories, municipalities, peoples' utility districts and cooperatives."4 The other Act,3 5 as
modified in 1937,36 authorizes the Reconstruction Finance Corporation,
through the Disaster Loan Corporation, to make loans for repair, construction, reconstruction or rehabilitation of property of municipalities or
political subdivisions of states or of their public agencies where such property has been destroyed or rendered unfit for use by reason of catastrophe.
Reference to catastrophe laws brings to mind still another recent act
s7
bearing upon federal-municipal relations. The Flood Control Act of 1936,
which, after reciting that "it is the sense of Congress that flood control on
navigable waters or their tributaries is a proper activity of the Federal Government in cooperation with States, their political subdivisions, and localities thereof", 38 authorizes the Army Engineers to undertake certain improvements for the benefit of navigation and the control of destructive
29. BETTERs, op. cit. supra note 23, at 19.

30. 48 STAT. 162 (1933), 12 U. S. C. A. §227 (936).
31. Created by Executive Order No. 7034, of May 6, 1935, pursuant to the EmERGENCy
RFL= APPROPRIATiON AcT OF 1935, 49 STAT. 115 (1935), I5 U. S. C. A. § 72r (Supp. 1937).
32. In this connection, see Ecker-R, The Quest for Direct Relief Funds (936) 25 NAT.
MuNIc. REV. 393.
33. 49 STAT. 1363 (1936), 7 U. S. C. A. § 9oi (Supp. 1937).
34. For a discussion of the work of the Rural Electrification Administration, see Cooke,
Municipalitiesand the R. E. A. (1936) 25 NAT. MUNIC. REv. 262.
35. 49 STAT. I232 (936), 15 U. S. C. A. §6o5k (Supp. 1937).
36. Pub. L. No. 5, 75th Cong., ist Sess. (Feb. 11, I937).
37. 49 STAT. 1570 (1936), 33 U. S. C. A. § 7oIa (Supp. 1937).
38. Ibid.
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flood waters, only after certain conditions have been met. One of these
requirements is that states, political subdivisions thereof, or other responsible local agencies give "assurances satisfactory to the Secretary of War
that they will (a) provide without cost to the United States all lands, easements, and rights-of-way necessary for the construction of the project;
* * (b) hold and save the United States free from damages due to the
construction works; (c) maintain and operate all the works after comple0
tion in accordance with regulations prescribed by the Secretary of War".A
Preferential Legislation
Although the recent acts which afford preferences to public bodies are
not numerous, they are extremely significant. The clearest example of this
type of legislation is the statute creating the Tennessee Valley Authority. 40
That Act authorizes the board to sell surplus power to states, counties, municipalities, corporations, partnerships or individuals, giving preference to
states, counties, municipalities and cooperatives.*1 Furthermore, the Act
declares it to be the policy of the Government, so far as practical, to distribute and sell the surplus power generated at Muscle Shoals equitably
among the states, counties, and municipalities within transmission distance. 42
Included in the category of preferential legislation is the statute creating the Rural Electrification Administration.4 Although that Act authorized loans to persons, corporations, states, territories, municipalities, peoples'
utility districts and cooperatives, preference is provided " for the latter five
groups.
Another clear example is the act recently approved, 45 which authorizes
the completion, maintenance and operation of the Bonneville hydro-electric
project and provides in Section 4 (a) that "In order to insure that the facilities for the generation of electric energy at the Bonneville project shall
be operated for the benefit of the general public, and particularly of domestic and rural consumers, the Administrator shall at all times, in disposing
of electric energy generated at said project, give preference and priority to
public bodies and cooperatives," public bodies being defined as "States,
public power districts, counties, and municipalities, including agencies or
46
subdivisions of any thereof".
It is not to be supposed that the type of legislation just described, the
so-called preferential legislation, though it is recent, is exclusively a cur39. Id. at 1571, 33 U. S. C. A. § 70C.
40. 48 STAT. 58 (1933), 16 U. S. C. A. § 831 (Supp. 1937).
41. Id. at 64, 16 U. S. C. A. § 83Ii.
42. Id. at 64, 16 U. S. C. A. § 83ij.
43. 49 STAT. 1363 (1936), 7 U. S. C. A. § 9oi (Supp. 1937).
44. Id. at 1365, 7 U. S. C. A. § 9o4.
45. Pub. L. No. 329, 75th Cong., Ist Sess. (Aug. 20, 1937).

46. Id. § 3.
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rent development. As far back as 192o, the Federal Water Power Act 4
authorized the Federal Power Commission to grant licenses for power
projects on streams subject to federal jurisdiction, and provided for a pref48
erence in the issuance of preliminary permits to states and municipalities.
And furthermore, that Act provided that "licenses for the development,
transmission, or distribution of power by States or municipalities shall be
issued without charge to the extent that such power is sold to the public
without profit or is used by such State or municipality for State or municipal purposes." 42 However, much greater strides have been made in federal legislation to insure preferential treatment for public agencies in the
years subsequent to 1932.

Exremptive Legislation
In addition to the recent federal legislation affecting municipalities of
the enabling and of the preferential types, there is the exemptive group.
Into this category fall the acts, which, but for language exempting their
effect upon municipalities and similar public bodies, would have applied
to such municipalities.
The adoption of the so-called "Pink Slip Amendment" in April, 1935,50
was a distinct aid to local taxing officials. The income tax returns, it will
be recalled, were required under the Revenue Act of 1934 to be summarized
on a small pink slip of paper.5 1 The 1935 amendment withdrew these pink
slips from public inspection but made them available to state and local taxing officials. A well known authority, in commenting on this amendment,
has said: "Thus, by Congressional enactment, there has been provided a
simple and efficient procedure by which local tax officials may discover the
existence of taxable properties as well as the names of the owners. The
Federal government, in helping local units of government to help themselves has paved the way for a material increase in local revenues and a
consequent larger assumption of responsibility for local finances by states
and municipalities." 52
Two recent statutes providing for tax exemption also fall in this
group.53 The first of the two recent acts was the Revenue Act of 1935,"'
which lifted the manufacturers' excise tax imposed by the Revenue Act of
47. 41 STAT.I063 (1920), I6 U. S. C. A. § 79i (1927).
48. Id. at 1O67, 16 U. S. C. A. § 8oo.

49. Id. at io6q, 16 U. S. C. A. § 803e.
5O. 49 STAT. I58 (1935), 26 U. S. C. A. § 55 (Supp. 1937).
5!. 48 STAT. 698 (1934).
52. BETTERs, op. Cit. supra note 23, at 23.

53. It should be remarked that only recent developments in this field are being considered. No attempt is made to go into the more far-flung effects of the exemption now granted
from taxation of the income derived from municipal securities. See infra note 139.
54. 49 STAT. 1014 (I935), 26 U. S. C. A. § 12 (Supp. 1937).
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1932,"5

from all purchases made for the exclusive use "of the United States,
any State, Territory of the United States, or any political subdivision of
the foregoing, or the District of Columbia." The other was the 1933
Act 56 amending the Revenue Act of 1932, which imposed a three percent

tax upon all payments by consumers for electric energy. The 1933 amendment, however, provided that "none of the provisions of this section [616]
shall apply to publicly owned electric and power plants." 57
The Public Utility Act of 193 5 " affords still another instance of an
exemption afforded to municipalities. There provision is made for the registration, regulation, and control of public utility holding companies; but
a clause 5 9 specifically exempts from the effects of that Act "the United
States, a State, or any political subdivision" thereof in their operation of
utility properties.
Additional legislative enactments specifically exempting municipalities
from their operations are the Securities Act of 1933 (o and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.61

All the registration requirements of the former

are inapplicable to securities issued by "any political subdivision of a State
or Territory",6 2 and under the latter, municipal securities fall within the
"exempted security" category. 63
In this review of the so-called municipal enabling, preferential and exemptive legislation, no attempt has been made to include every recent federal-municipal relationship. The effect of the Social Security Act 64 on
local relief problems; 65 the benefits to municipalities from the Federal
67
Surplus Commodities Corporation,"6 the Civilian Conservation Corps,
the Farm Security Administration 6 8 and the National Youth Administration; 69 the new federal-city relationships in crime control; 70 the effect on
55. 47 STAT. 169 (1932), 26 U. S. C. A. § I et seq. (1935).
56. 48 STAT. 254 (933).
57. Id. at 256.
58. 49 STAT. 803 (I935), I5 U. S. C. A. § 79a et seq. (Supp. 1937).
59. Id. at 8Io, i5 U. S. C. A. § 79b (c).
6o. 48 STAT. 74 (933), 15 U. S. C. A. § 77a (Supp. 1937).
61. 48 STAT. 88I (1934), i5 U. S. C. A. §78a (Supp. 1937).
62. 48 STAT. 74 (1933), 15 U. S. C. A. § 77c (a) (2) (Supp. 1937).
63. 48 STAT. 881 (934), 15 U. S. C. A. §78c (12) (Supp. 1937).
64. 49 STAT. 620 (i935), 42 U. S. C. A. § 301 (Supp. 1937).
65. For a discussion of the effect of this Act on federal-state relationships, see Clark,
Federal-StateCooperation Under the Social Security Act (1936) 25 NAT. Mumic. Rxv. i5r.
66. Formerly Federal Surplus Relief Corporation, incorporated under the laws of Delaware, October 4, 1933.
67. Created, as the Emergency Conservation Work, by Executive Order No. 61oi, April
5, 1933.
68. Formerly, Resettlement Administration, created by Executive Order No. 7027, April
30o, 1935.
69. Created by Executive Order No. 7086, June 26, 1935.
7o. For example: the amendment to the FEDmEAL KiDAPING AcT, 48 STAT. 781 (934),
I8 U. S. C. A. § 4o8a (Supp. i937) ; the act providing punishment for offenses committed
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local regulation of utility rates of the so-called Johnson bill of 1934; 71 and
the results of the two 1936 Acts authorizing payments by the Federal Government of sums in lieu of taxes on federal property 7 2 -all of these and
many others deserve special mention. However, only three of the most
significant aspects of recent federal-municipal relationships have been selected for special treatment: public works, municipal bankruptcy and housing.
The Public Works Administration
The activity of the Public Works Administration 73 constitutes the
clearest example of the new type of federal-municipal relationships. Here,
on a scale never before attempted, the Federal Government entered into
direct negotiations with cities and other local public bodies. The Public
Works Administration makes loans and grants to states and local public
bodies to aid in financing useful public works. Its activity reflects the Federal Government's efforts to help localities solve their unemployment problems by offering to buy municipal obligations when the financial markets
were unreceptive, and to make grants when encouragement to construct useful public works projects was needed. Bonds of municipalities, counties,
townships, districts, authorities and states were purchased to aid74 in financing the construction of every conceivable type of public works.
against banks organized under the laws of the United States or any member of the Federal
Reserve System, 48 STAT. 783 (934), 12 U. S. C. A. § 588a (1936) ; the act providing for
prosecutions against persons who interfere with trade or commerce, by violence, threats,
coercion or intimidation, 48 STAT. 979 (1934), 18 U. S. C. A. §42oa (Supp. 1937) ; the
18 U. S. C. A. §413 (Supp. 1937);
NATIONAL STOLEN PROPERTY ACT, 48 STAT. 794 (934),
and the NATIONAL FIREARms ACT, 48 STAT. 1236 (1934), 26 U. S. C. A. § 1132 (Supp. 1937).

71. 48 STAT. 775 (934), 28 U. S. C. A. §41 (I) (Supp. 1937).
72. 49 STAT. 2025 (1936), 40 U. S. C. A. § 421 (Supp. 1937) (as to the Federal Emergency Administration of Public Works); 49 STAT. 2035 (1936), 40 U. S. C. A. § 431 (Supp.
1937) (as to the Resettlement Administration).
73. Created pursuant to Title II of the NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL REcOVERY ACT, 48 STAT.
200 (933), 40 U. S. C. A. § 401 (Supp. 1937). The appropriation for the purposes of carrying out this Act was contained in the FOURTH DEFIcIENcy AcT, fiscal year 1933, 48 STAT. 274
(1933). Provisions for additional funds and for authorizing the Reconstruction Finance Corporation to purchase marketable securities from the Public Works Administration were contained in the EMERGENCY APPROPRIATION AcT, fiscal year 1935, 48 STAT. 1055 (1934), 15 U.
S. C. A. § 6og d) (Supp. 1937). The Public Works Administration was continued until
June 30, 1937, by the EMERGENCY RELIEF APPROPRIATION ACT OF 1935, 49 STAT. 115 (1935), 15
U. S. C. A. § 728 (Supp. 1937). The FIRST DEFIcIENCY APPROPRIATION AcT, fiscal year 1936,
49 STAT. i6o8 (1936), 15 U. S. C. A. § 728 (Supp. 1937), authorized the use of funds not to
exceed $3o,ooooo for grants from the Public Works Administration Revolving Fund, theretofore available only for loans; the initial appropriation for administrative expenses for the
fiscal year 1938 was carried in the INDEPENDENT OFFIcEs APPROPRIATION ACT, Pub. L. No.
171, 75th Cong., Ist Sess. (June 28, 1937) ; the Public Works Administration was continued
until June 30, 1939, by the PuBLIc WORKS ADMINISTRATION EXTENSION AcT OF 1937, Pub.
Res. No. 47, 75th Cong., Ist Sess. (June 29, 1937).
74. For detailed information on allotments, employment created, bonds purchased, grants
made and other data affecting the Public Works Administration, see Report of the Business
of the Federal Emergency Administrator of Public Works for the Period Ending Feb. ,5,
x934, SEN. Doc. No. 167, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934). See also testimony of the Federal
Emergency Administrator of Public Works, Hearings Before Sub-Committee of Senate
Committee on Appropriations on the First Deficiency Appropriation Bill, r936, 74th Cong., 2d
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Not only in its size, but also in its nature, is this type of federal-city
cooperation unique. The procedure of tie Administration combines the
advantage of federal credit, when municipal markets are faltering, with
complete independence on the part of local governmental units.7 5 These local
agencies initiate the projects; formulate the design; let the construction
contracts, determine the size, scope and location; and issue the bonds. When
completed, the project is that of the local governmental unit, locally built,
locally owned and locally operated. The Federal Government has merely
aided in the financing. None of the established local procedure has been
changed. If bonds have been issued, they have been authorized in accordance with state laws. Construction has been undertaken in the normal manner. The Administration has demonstrated that it is entirely possible,
amidst all the complexities of a dual system of government, to evolve a
satisfactory, workable federal-municipal relationship without affecting the
independence of local self-government.
But selfish interests have engaged the Public Works Administration in
litigation almost from the beginning of its program. 76 In challenging the
legality of the Administrator's acts under federal law, several far-reaching
issues have been raised. They may be said to include:
(i) Whether the plaintiffs have the right to attack the constitutionality
of the applicable statutes or to assert alleged violations thereof; 77
Sess. (1936); Hearings Before Sub-Comnittee of House Committee on Appropriations of
the Independent Offices Appropriation Bill for 1938, 75th Cong., Ist Sess. (1937) ; Hearings
Before Sub-Committee of House Committee on Appropriations on the Extension of the Public Works Administratiol, 75th Cong., Ist Sess. (937).
75. See The Purposes,Policies, Functioning,and Organization of the Emergency Administration, P. W. A. Circular No. I, July 31, 1933.
76. The following federal cases involve attacks upon the constitutionality of acts affecting the Public Works Administration: Allegan v. Consumers' Power Co., 71 F. (2d) 477 (C.
C. A. 6th, 1934), cert. denied, 293 U. S. 586 (1934) ; Missouri Pub. Serv. Co. v. Concordia,
8 F. Supp. i (W. D. Mo. 1934) ; Missouri Util. Co. v. California, 8 F. Supp. 454 (W. D. Mo.
1934) ; Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 8 F. Supp. 893 (N. D. Ala. 1934), rev'd,
78 F. (2d) 578 (C. C. A. 5th, 1935), aff'd, 296 U. S. 288 (1936) ; Washington Water Power
Co. v. Coeur d'Alene, 9 F. Supp. 263 (D. Idaho, 1934) ; Arkansas-Missouri Power Co. v.
Kennett, 78 F. (2d) 911 (C. C. A. 8th, 1935) ; Kansas Gas & Electric Co. v. Independence,
79 F. (2d) 638 (C. C. A. ioth, 1935) ; Missouri Power & Light Co. v. La Plata, lo F. Supp.
653 (E. D. Mo. 1935); Iowa Southern Util. Co. v. Lamoni, ii F. Supp. 581 (S. D. Iowa,
1935); Illinois Power & Light Corp. v. Centralia, 1i F. Supp. 874 (E. D. Ill. 1935), rev'd,
89 F. (2d) 985 (C. C. A. 7th, 1937); Interstate Power Co. v. Cushing, 12 F. Supp. 8o6
(W. D. Okla. 1935); Kansas Power Co. v. Hoisington, 89 F. (2d) 358 (C. C. A. ioth,
1937) ; Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, 91 F. (2d) 3o3 (App. D. C. 1937), cert. granted, 3O

U. S. 681 (937) ; Duke Power Co. v. Greenwood County,
1937), modified, 91 F. (2d) 665 (C. C. A. 4th, 1937) ; Graff
Aug. 12, 1937; Arkansas-Missouri Power Co. v. Thayer, U.
1937; Carolina Power & Light Co. v. South Carolina Public

19 F. Supp. 932 (W. D. S. C.

v. Seward, U. S. D. C. Alaska,

S. D. C., W. D. Mo., Aug. 25,
Service Authority, U. S. D. C.,

E. D. S. C., Aug. 31, 1937.

See letter from the Assistant Administrator, Federal Emergency Administration of Public Works, transmitting, in response to Sen. Res. No. 82, 75th Cong., Ist Sess. (937), information concerning injunctions issued or rendered by federal courts since March 4, 1933,
in cases involving Acts of Congress, SEN. Doc. No. 27, 75th Cong., Ist Sess. 0937).
77. The Federal Government has taken the position that they do not, on the theory
that unless a plaintiff can show an invasion of his private legal rights by the Administrator,
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(2) Whether the proposed loans or grants are authorized by the applicable statute; 78
(3) Whether the applicable statutes unlawfully delegate legislative
power to the Administrator; 79
(4) Whether the applicable statutes are a constitutional exercise of the
power of Congress to spend public funds to promote the general welfare; 80
and
(5) Whether the effect of the applicable statutes is to invade the
reserved power of the states."'
It is apparent that all these issues are of significance. It is the fifth
category, however,-the alleged invasion of the reserved powers of stateswhich affects the subject of federal-municipal relationships.
The litigation usually results from an offer by the Government to make
a loan or grant or both to aid in financing the construction of a public power
plant. The contention is made that the necessary effect of the applicable
statutes is the regulation of intrastate power rates; hence, the statute is
unconstitutional because it invades the exclusive province of the states in
violation of the Tenth Amendment.
This regulation of intrastate rates, it is claimed, results from the competition between the plaintiffs and the public body. Of course, there is no
evidence to the effedt that competition means regulation. But even if the
competition can be said to involve regulation, to be denounced as illegal, such
regulation must be by the Federal Government. However, to claim this
result is to presuppose that once the loan and grant are made to a public
body, competition is the inevitable result. The fallacy of this argument
becomes obvious when it is realized that if competition occurs, it will be at
he has no cause of action against the Administrator, and therefore there is no occasion for a
court to consider whether the Administrator's conduct, which would otherwise be actionable,
is justified by a constitutional statute. See Note (1934) 48 Hav. L. REv. 89.
78. The Government has taken the position that they are authorized, on the theory that
the projects attacked are found in the terms of the statute; that the statute has received a
consistent administrative interpretation sustaining the Government's position; and that subse!quent legislation has either adopted and ratified the previous administrative interpretations
or have furnished independent authority for the Administrator's actions.
79. The Government's position has been that there is no unlawful delegation, on the
theory that the applicable acts provide adequate standards to guide the Executive in the expenditure of moneys appropriated and that the Constitution does not require Congress to
specify in detail the manner in which public money is to be expended. For a detailed discussion of this point see Cowan, Federal Spending Power and Delegation (1937) 5 GEO.
WAsH. L. Ray. 8og.
8o. The Government's position has been that they are constitutional, on the theory that
the expenditures greatly relieve distress, increase employment, and help substantially to
revive interstate business and industry, resulting in an increase of purchasing power, of the
consumption of goods and of the national income.
470; Note (1935) 3 GEo. WAsr. L. REV. 218.

See Note (1935) 2 U. OF CHI.

L. R-v.

81. The Government's position has been that such is not the effect, on the theory that no
coercive or regulatory power is being exercised by the Federal Government in violation of
the Tenth Amendment.
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the election of the public body-an agency of the state-and not as a result
of action forced by the Federal Government. Consequently, if there is
competition, and even if we assume such competition to be "regulation", such
regulation is accomplished by the state acting through its political subdivision
and not by the Federal Government.
In the four instances in which the circuit courts of appeals have been
called upon to decide the question, they have emphatically stated that the
procedure followed by the Public Works Administration in making loans
and grants conforms to our federal system and constitutes no violation of the
Tenth Amendment.
Thus, in Arkansas-MissouriPower Co. v. Kennett,8 2 the court said:
"The United States is not proposing to become a competitor of
the power company. It will have no right, title, or interest in the plant
when completed and nothing to do with operating it. The destruction
of the power company's property will come about by reason of the city's
operation of the plant when erected. The position of the United States
is that of a lender of money, a buyer of bonds, and a giver of gifts." 83
In Kansas Gas & Electric Co. v. Independence,8 4 the court disposed of
the argument of coercion as follows:
"In the instant case the grant is to be expended by a state agency.
The federal government does not, under the provisions of the National
Industrial Recovery Act here involved, propose to enter the territory
of the states and there through its own agencies and instrumentalities
engage in a nonfederal activity. It simply proposes, in order to promote
the general welfare of the United States, to advance funds by loans
or grants to the states and their agencies to carry out their own powers
to construct public works. The state is free to accept a loan or grant as
it wills and there is no encroachment on state sovereignty." 85
When the case of Duke Power Co. v. Greenwood County s6 first came
before the circuit court of appeals, that court went into some detail to show
that there was no encroachment on state power, pointing out:
"It is, of course, true that, as Congress may not encroach upon the
reserved powers of the states, officers acting under its authority may
not so encroach; and the authority of such officers in administering acts
of Congress must be held to be limited by the bounds of Congressional
power. The administrator, for example, could not, under the guise of
carrying out the public works program, make such an expenditure of
public funds as would interfere with the states in the exercise of their
82. 78 F. (2d) gII (C.C. A. 8th, 1935).
83. Id. at
84. 79 F.
85. Id. at
86. 81 F.

914.
(2d) 638 (C. C. A. ioth, 1935).
639.
(2d) 986 (C. C. A. 4th, 1936).
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reserved powers. See U. S. v. Butler, supra. But we do not understand that any such thing is being done here. Greenwood County is but
an agency of the state of South Carolina and remains subject to the
control of that state in the management of its power project as well as
in other matters. The rates to be charged by public utilities remain
subject to state control. All that the administrator proposes to do is to
make a loan and grant to the county to enable it to engage in an enterprise which, as a subdivision of the state, it has been given by the state
the right and power to engage in. . ..

We are unable to see how

lending or giving money to a state agency for such purpose can be
said to be an encroachment on state power. It is an entirely different
thing from giving or lending money to private persons for the purpose
of defeating a state policy or regulating matters under state control." 87
And when Duke Power Co. v. Greenwood County came before the same
court for the second time,8 8 its conclusions on this point were reiterated as
follows:
"Likewise, our conclusion that the statute cannot be condemned
as an invasion of the reserved powers of the states is fortified by the
decision in Stewart Mach. Co. v. Davis, supra, wherein the Court said
that before a statute could be condemned on this ground there must be
a showing that the things which it authorizes are 'weapons of coercion,
destroying or impairing the autonomy of the states.' 57 S. Ct. 89o.
The carrying out of the program of public works authorized by the
statute for the relief of unemployment cannot possibly have this effect,
and specifically, the making of loans and grants to municipal corporations to enable them to engage in enterprises which the states have
authorized them to engage in cannot, in any use of language, be said
to abridge or invade the powers of the states.

.

.

.

Any effect which

such loans and grants may have upon rates will be incidental to the
competition engendered by the construction of the projects; and where
the state itself authorizes the projects and the procuring of the loans
and grants for their construction . . . and retains the right of regu-

lating the rates through the exercise of state power, it cannot be contended with any show of reason that the power of the state is encroached
upon by the making of the loans and grants or by the competition
resulting from the construction of the projects which they make
possible."

89

Indeed, it is difficult to see how any other conclusion logically could be
reached. So far as rates and competition are concerned, these questions
are capable of ready disposition. The interest of the Administrator in the,
rates to be charged by a municipality for services rendered by a project
87. Id. at 995.
88. 9i F. (2d) 665 (C. C. A. 4th, 1937) [after having been remanded by the Supreme
Court, 299 U. S. 259 (1936), to the district court and after a denial of the plaintiffs' request
for an injunction by the district court, ig F. Supp. 932 (W. D. S. C. 1937)].
89. 9i F. (2d) 665, 673 (C. C. A. 4th, 1937).
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financed by a federal loan is the same as that of any prudent investor. There
is no effort to coerce the municipality to reduce rates. If anything, the effect
of the transaction is to prevent the rates from being reduced below a certain
minimum, since most of the rate ordinances require that the rates must be adequate to pay debt service and reasonable operating and maintenance charges.
So far as competition is concerned, it is admittedly authorized under
state law. When it is seen that a municipality voluntarily files its application
for federal assistance, selects the type of project it wants, has authority under
the state law to undertake the construction of the project selected and to
finance it in the manner proposed 90 it becomes apparent at once that reserved
powers of the states are not violated.
Those who have challenged the constitutionality of the Public Works
Administration Acts on the basis of violation of the Tenth Amendment have
relied strongly on the decision in United States v. Butler.9 1 It will be
recalled the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 92 was declared invalid in
this case on the theory that, while framed in terms of the spending power, it
was "a statutory plan to regulate and control agricultural production, a
matter beyond the powers delegated to the Federal Government." 93 A
brief review of the National Industrial Recovery Act 94 and the Agricultural
Adjustment Act will clearly demonstrate the difference betwen the two. The'
latter was deemed compulsory in effect. To use the words of Justice Roberts, it was considered by the majority of the Court as "a scheme for purchasing with federal funds submission to federal regulation of a subject
reserved to the states." 95 In the Public Works Administration Acts, on
the other hand, there is no compulsion and no attempt to exert a regulatory
power over matters reserved to the states.
This distinction is supported by the observations of the District Court
for the District of Columbia in the case of Alabama Power Company v.
Ickes.96 The plaintiff power company sought to enjoin the execution of loan
and grant agreements made by the Federal Emergency Administrator of
Public Works with four municipal corporations, from each of which the
plaintiff held a non-exclusive franchise. Each agreement contemplated the
go. In most of the cases in which the constitutionality of the Public Works Administra-

tion is challenged, the financing contemplated by the public body has been by way of revenue
bonds. For a discussion of this method of financing under state laws, see Foley, Some Recent
Developments it the Law Relating to Municipal Financing of Public Works (1935) 4 FORDAEmL. Rrv. 13; Foley, Revenue Financing of Public Enterprises (1936) 35 MICH. L.
REv. i; Pershing, Revenue Bond Remedies (1936) 22 CoRw. L. Q. 64; Williams and Nehemhis, Municipal Improvements as Affected by Constitutional Debt Limitations (1937) 37 COL.
L. R.Ev. 177.
91. 297 U. S. I (1936), 84 U. OF PA. L. REv. 547.
92. 48 STAT. 31 (1933), 7 U. S. C. A. §§6OI-659 (Supp. 1937).
93. 297 U. S. I, 68 (1936).
94. 48 STAT. 195 (I933), 15 U. S. C. A. §701 (Supp. 1937).
95. 297 U. S. 1, 72 (1936).

96. Decision rendered June 5, 1936, unreported.
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construction of a municipally owned electric-distribution system. Relying on
the Butler case, the plaintiffs contended that the inevitable effect of the
agreements would be competition between the municipal and local private
utility plants, and that such competition would, in effect, constitute federal
regulation of intrastate power rates. The district court found, however:
"Each of the municipalities involved in this suit determined to
enter into the electric distribution business of its own free will. There
was no solicitation or coercion on the part of any of the defendants, their
agents or subordinates. There was and is no conspiracy between any
of the defendants and any other person, nor is there any other effort on
the part of any of the defendants to, nor are their actions motivated by
a desire to, cause injury or financial loss to the plaintiffs, or to regulate
their rates or electric rates generally, or to foster municipal ownership
of utilities.
"The expenditures under these statutes involve no purchase of,
nor contract providing for, regulation by the United States. The failure of any city to apply for or receive loans or grants under those
statutes will impose upon it no disadvantage or financial loss.
"The defendants have not reserved any right or power to influence
or control rates to be charged by the proposed municipal power
plants ...
"Neither the United States nor any of the defendants has reserved
any right or power under the existing contracts, or in any other way, to
require any of the municipalities to eliminate competition or to designate the person or agency from whom the municipality must purchase
its power ...
"Neither the United States nor any of the defendants has any
power to control the operation of the projects after construction is
completed. . .. ,,97
On appeal these findings were accepted by both the Circuit Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia and the United States Supreme Court,
in affirming the decrees of the district court, denying the injunctions and
dismissing the bills.
The district court, after consideration of the various arguments
already mentioned, challenging the validity of the Administrator's acts, held
that the plaintiffs had a standing to maintain the suits, but denied the injunctions on the ground that the statutory provisions conferring upon the Administrator the power which he had exercised were constitutional. On appeal, the
circuit court considered the validity of the loan and grant agreements, but
dismissed the bills after finding that no legal or equitable right of the power
company had been invaded and that the power company, therefore, could not
challenge the validity of the Administrator's acts.9 8 The Supreme Court,
97. Quoted by the Supreme Court in 58 Sup. Ct. 300, 302 (938).
F. (2d) 303 (App. D. C. 1937).

98. 91
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agreeing with the circuit court of appeals, declared that a federal taxpayer
cannot challenge the action of the Federal Government in extending financial
aid to municipalities, or the federal statutes authorizing such aid, provided
that: (a) the municipalities are authorized under state law to accept federal
moneys in aid of lawful municipal enterprises, (b) the municipalities determine to undertake such enterprises of their own free will, without solicitation
or coercion, and (c) the action of the municipalities or the Federal Government is not motivated by a desire to cause financial loss to existing competing utilities, to regulate their rates or to foster municipal ownership of
utilitiesY9
Thus, without passing upon the merits of the constitutional questions
which have been before the lower federal courts since 1934 in this and
similar cases, the Supreme Court virtually sanctioned this newest type of
federal-municipal relationship. This decision is one of far-reaching effect,
for it opens the way to further development of the federal-municipal concept.
The Municipal Bankruptcy Act
The Municipal Bankruptcy Act,1 00 passed in August, 1937, represents
a second attempt 1 01 on the part of Congress to invoke its power to pass
uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcy 102 for the purpose of facilitating
municipal debt readjustments.. 0 3 This legislation marks another significant
development in federal-municipal relationships. It is another example of
enabling legislation by which Congress, as under the acts relating to the
Public Works Administration,'0 4 has attempted to deal with municipalities
directly and independently of the states in so far as municipalities are not
10 5
prevented by state law from participating under the new Bankruptcy Act.
But this relationship differs from that resulting from the activities of the
Public Works Administration, the difference arising from the nature of the
federal assistance to municipalities and the channel through which it is ad99. 58 Sup. Ct. 300 (1938).

The case of Duke Power Co. v. Greenwood County, 91 F.

(2d) 665 (C. C. A. 4th, 1937), pending in the Supreme Court on certiorari at the time of the

decision in the Alabama Power case, was decided on the authority of the decision in the latter
case. 58 Sup. Ct. 3o6 (1938). See Note (1938) 36 MicH. L. REV. 587.
ioo. Pub. L. No. 302, 75th Cong., Ist Sess. (Aug. 16, 1937).

present Bankruptcy Act by adding §§ 81-84.
Ioi. See the NATIOzAL MuNicPAL DEBT

This Act amended the

READJUSTMENT AcT, 48 STAT. 798 (934), 11
U. S. C. A. § 301 (Supp. 1937), amended, 49 STAT. 1198 (1936), II U. S. C. A. § 302 (Supp.

1937).

Art. i, § 8, ci. 4.
io3. For a discussion of the recent financial collapse of municipalities and the historical
background therefor, see HUi.ousE, MuNiciPAL BoNDs (1936) ; Note (I934) 43 YALE L.
I02. U. S. CoNsT.

J.

924. See also Frye, Municipal Insolvency: Its Special Problems from the Point of View

of the General Practitioner (1937) 2 LEGAL No'rEs oN LOCAL Gov'T 195; Sauer, An Experitnent in,Muncipal Financing: Factual Background of Ashton v. Cameron County Improvement DistrictNo. One (1936) 5 GEo. WASH. L. REv. i; Stason, State Administrative Super-

vision of Municipal Indebtedness (1932) 30 MIca. L. REv. 833. See also infra note iii.
io4. See supra note 73.
1o5. Pub. L. No. 302, 75th Cong., ist Sess. (Aug. i6, 1937) § 83 (i).
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ministered. Here the assistance is offered through the medium of the federal
judicial system to financially distressed municipalities for the purpose of preserving their going value as units of local government, in contrast to direct
financial aid for the relief of unemployment through an independent agency
of the executive department.
Judicial relief to municipalities is unique in the field of federal-municipal
relationships. In 1934, Congress amended the Bankruptcy Act, which had
expressly excepted municipal corporations from the exercise of its bankruptcy
power, 106 by passing the National Municipal Debt Readjustment Act.10 7
The Act was designed to permit any distressed 108 municipality or political
subdivision of a state to effect a composition of its debts through the federal
courts. It provided a forum where, to use the language of the Act, "any
municipality or other political subdivision of any State" 109 or any "taxing
district" could meet voluntarily with its creditors in an effort to effect an
adjustment of its financial difficulties upon a mutually advantageous plan.
If the plan were agreed upon by the taxing district and by creditors holding
two-thirds in amount of its indebtedness adversely affected, and if the
federal court were satisfied that the plan was workable and equitable, the
court could confirm the plan. Thereupon the minority of the creditors
became bound by the terms of the plan and the jurisdiction of the court
ceased. The Act provided that it should not impair the power of any state
to control any political subdivision in the exercise of its political or governmental powers, including the power to require by state law the approval of
any state administrative agency before the Act could be availed of by such
political subdivision.
By the end of 1935, 46 proceedings spread over 13 states had been

commenced under this statute. 1 10 Thirty-one were instituted by drainage,
irrigation and levee districts,11 1 a class including perhaps the least solvent
io6. 36 STAT. 839 (igio), I! U. S. C. A. § ii (1927).
107. 48

STAT. 798 (934), II U. S. C. A. §301 (1937).
io8. ". . . insolvent or unable to meet its debts as they mature...
" 48 STAT. 798
(1934), II U. S. C. A. § 303 (a) (937).
1og. ". . . including (but not hereby limiting the generality of the foregoing) any

county, city, borough, village, parish, town, or township, unincorporated tax or special assessment district, and any school, drainage, irrigation, levee, sewer, or paving, sanitary, port,
improvement or other districts. . . ." Id. at 779, I1 U. S. C. A. § 303 (a).
110. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION REPORT ON THE STUDY AND INVESTIGA-

TION OF THE WORK, ACTIVITIES, PERSONNEL AND FUNCTIONS OF PROTECTIVE AND REORGANIZATION COMMITTEES (936)
Part 4, 122. As to the full extent of participation under

the Act, see statement furnished by National Drainage, Levee and Irrigation District Ass'n;
and by Mr. Scott, President of the Ass'n, Hearings Before Sub-Committee of House Committee on the Judiciary on H. R. 25o5, 25o6, 5403, 5969, 75th Cong., Ist Sess. (937)
143.
III. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION REPORT, op. Cit. suPra note iio, at 123.
For a general discussion of the extent of municipal defaults, see HILHOUSE, Op. Cit. SUPra
note 98, at I-3O; HORTON, LONG TERM DEBrs IN THE UNITED STATES (U. S. Dep't of Commerce, Domestic Commerce Series, No. 96, 1937) 179-184. For summary of municipal defaults, see Shanks, Municipal Bond Defaults (1937) 26 NAT. MUNIc. REV. 296.
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units. But in May, 1936, before there had been time for any definite legislative experience under the Act, it was declared invalid in Ashton v. Cameron
County Water District No. 1.112
The Legislature of Texas had granted political subdivisions the express
right to proceed under the federal law. 113 The Supreme Court recognized
Cameron County Water Improvement District No. i as a political subdivision
of Texas. 11 4 Speaking for a majority of the Court, Mr. Justice McReynolds
perceived in the inclusion of local governmental units within the subject of
bankruptcy an encroachment upon the reserved power of a state over the
fiscal affairs of its political subdivisions in violation of the Tenth Amendment. In support of this view, he relied upon the absence of any expressed
intent in the Constitution to include governmental units within the grant
of power to Congress. Mr. Justice Cardozo pointed out in the dissenting
opinion, 115 however, that it is not sufficient that the Act affronts the dignity
of the state but that the test should be whether the extension of bankruptcy
jurisdiction to local governmental units dislocates the balance between state
and national power. He concluded that, although the Act might threaten
dislocation so far as it was applicable to political subdivisions of the state,
the consent of the state would preserve the balance.
The scope of the Ashton decision has been interpreted by the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals in the case of In re ImperialIrrigationDistrict116
as outlawing all "political subdivisions" from participating under the old
Municipal Debt Readjustment Act. The Imperial Irrigation District had
sought a rehearing on the ground that the Supreme Court of California had
held that an irrigation district is "not a political subdivision of the state or
county, or a political subdivision at all." 11 The court of appeals ruled
that, if the petitioning district is a political subdivision, relief is precluded
112. 298 U. S. 513 (1936), 85 U. OF PA. L. REv. iii. The constitutionality of the first
Act had been questioned. Briggs, Shall Bankruptcy Jurisdiction Be Extended to Include
Municipalitiesand Other Taxable Subdivisions (1933) ig A. B. A. J. 637; Morford, Federal
Legislationfor Corporate Reorganization;A Negative View (1933) ig A. B. A. J. 702, 703;
Stebbins, Constitutionality of the Recent Amendment to the Bankruptcy Law (1933) 17
MARQ. L. REV. 161. But see Legis. (1933) 35 COL L. REv. 429, 46 HARV. L. Ray. 1317; Note
(1934) 43 YALE L. 3. 924, 972-974.
i13. 2 TEx. STAT. ANN. (Vernon, Supp. 1937) art. Io24a.
114. "The respondent was organized . . . as Cameron County Irrigation District No.
One, to furnish water for irrigation and domestic uses; in 1919, it became the Cameron
County Water Improvement District No. One, all as authorized by statutes passed under
§ 52, Art. 3, Constitution of Texas, which permits creation of political divisions of the State,
with power to sue and be sued, issue bonds, levy and collect taxes. An Amendment to the
Constitution-§ 59a, Art. i6-(October 2, 1917) declares the conservation and development
of all the natural resources of the State, including reclamation of lands and their preservation,
are 'public rights and duties.' . . . It is plain enough that respondent is a political subdivision of the State, created for the local exercise of her sovereign powers...." 298 U.
S. 513, 527 (1936).
115. Id. at 532.
116. 87 F. (2d) 355 (C. C. A. 9th, 1936).
117. Wood v. Imperial Irrigation Dist., 216 Cal. 748, 753, 13 P. (2d) 128, 13o (1932).
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by the Ashton decision; whereas, if it is not a political subdivision, the Federal Act affords no remedy for the reason that the Act is applicable only to
political subdivisions.
Congress undertook to remove what it conceived to be the constitutional
objections in the earlier act by passing another Municipal Bankruptcy Act 118
this year. Despite the sweeping implications of the majority opinion in the
Asiton case, the new Act apparently rests on the theory that a vital distinction can be drawn between political subdivisions exercising sovereign powers
and municipal corporations. 119 This seems to be the basis 120 for the limitation of the Act to six described classes of taxing districts,1 21 the sixth
class including "any city, town, village, borough, township, or other municipality". 1 22 No reference is made to political subdivisions 123 though it will
118. Pub. L. No. 302, 75th Cong., Ist Sess. (Aug. 16, 1937).
i19. "The bill here recommended for passage expressly avoids any restriction on the
powers of the States or their arms of government in the exercise of their sovereign rights
and duties. No interference with the fiscal or governmental affairs of a political subdivision
is permitted. The taxing agency itself is the only instrumentality which can seek the benefits
of the proposed legislation." SEN. REP. No. 911, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (I937) 2.
"Therefore, the applicability of the pending bill to any taxing district or agency rests
on the corporate character of each petitioner and depends in the actual interference, if any,
with its essential governmental functions.... ".H. R. REP. No. 517, 75th Cong., ist Sess.

(I937) 3.

I2O. Thus, Representative Wilcox, debating H. R. 5969, 75th Cong., Ist Sess. (1937), in

the House, said: "The constitutionality of this bill can be distinguished from the other bill in
this way: The original bill extended to those subdivisions of a State government, which are
essentially arms of the State government. Now we have left out of this bill counties and
those other subdivisions which are essentially a part of the State." 8r CoNG. RFc., June 24,
1937, at 8219.

And Senator Pepper, commenting on the bill when it was under consideration in the
Senate, remarked: "The first bill included counties, which are, in the opinion of a great many
people, actual instrumentalities of sovereignty, agencies through which the State carries on
the sovereign functions of the government, which is not true with respect to drainage districts
or levee districts or road or school districts." 8I CONG. REc., Aug. 9, 1937, at xo963.
121. ". . . (1) Drainage, drainage and levee, levee and drainage, reclamation, water, irrigation, or other similar districts, commonly designated as agricultural improvement districts
or local improvement districts, organized or created for the purpose of constructing, improving, maintaining, and operating certain improvements or projects devoted chiefly to the improvement of lands therein for agricultural purposes; or (2) local improvement districts such
as sewer, paving, sanitary, or other similar districts, organized or created for the purposes
designated by their respective names; or (3) local improvement districts such as road, highway, or other similar districts, organized or created for the purpose of grading, paving, or
otherwise improving public streets, roads, or highways; or (4) public-school districts or
public-school authorities organized or created for the purpose of constructing, maintaining,
and operating public schools or public school facilities; or (5) local improvement districts
such as port, navigation, or other similar districts, organized or created for the purpose of
constructing, improving, maintaining and operating ports and port facilities; or (6) any city,
town, village, borough, township, or other municipality. . . ." A saving clause follows,
designed to save the Act otherwise if any one or more of the taxing agencies classified therein
should be held to be political subdivisions exercising sovereign powers. Pub. L. No. 302, 75th
Cong., Ist Sess. (Aug. 16, 1937).
122. Ibid.
123. Ibid. See statement by Representative Wilcox: " . . I wish to point out . . .
the fact that whereas the original bill which was held in the Ashton case . . . to be unconstitutional, referred to all the petitioners designated therein as political subdivisions of the
State, in the pending bill all such references have been eliminated, and no such petitioner as
Cameron County Water Improvement District could take advantage of this act. All such
political subdivisions have been eliminated. Therefore, the decision of the Supreme Court of
the United States in the Ashton case is wholly without effect upon the constitutionality of
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be recalled that the first Act grouped the various classes of taxing districts
under the category of political subdivisions.' 24 The procedural aspects of
the new Act remain substantially unchanged from those of the old Act.
But is the argument tenable that by restricting the Act to municipalities
and other local taxing districts, exclusive of counties and other political
subdivisions not named in the Act, Congress has overcome the constitutional
objection that an extension of the bankruptcy power to local governmental
units invades the sovereign power of the states in violation of the Tenth
Amendment? 125
The assumed difference in the character of a political subdivision from
that of a municipal corporation, on which the limited scope of the Act is
postulated, 126 is that a political subdivision is deemed to be a public body
superimposed by the state solely for the administration locally of state govern128
mental functions,1 27 whereas a municipality functions in a dual capacity.
the pending bill. The strictures of that decision with reference to all other classes of petitioners other than such political subdivisions are clearly obiter dicta." 81 CONG. REc., June
24, 1937, at 8214.

124. See suprac note io8, and text relative thereto.
125. Although the scope of the Ashton decision is not clear, the distinction on which the
second Act rests does not appear to find support in the majority opinion. The new Act permits the same degree of !'interference" with the power of a state over the fiscal affairs of a
municipality which, in a broad sense, is a political subdivision of the state as did the invalid
Act. That the Act cannot be reconciled with the majority opinion appears to be true, notwithstanding that the majority analogized the bankruptcy power to the taxing power, in the
exercise of which the distinction between the proprietary and governmental character of a
municipality has been recognized. See infra note 131. But see Black, Has Congress Circunvented the Ashton Decisionf (1937) 23 A. B. A. J.683.
126. See supra notes iig, i2O, 123, and text relative thereto.
In the Opinion of Special Assistant Attorney General Charles Weston, issued April 21,
1933 [reported in part in C. C. H. BANKR. SERV. 12803 (933)1, it was declared that the
proposed amendment, H. R. 3083, 73d Cong., Ist Sess. (I933), to the Bankruptcy Act was
constitutional only in its application to municipalities in the strict sense. "The private or
proprietary capacity of a municipality" was deemed to be "sufficiently distinct and definite
to bring it within the purview of the bankruptcy power", whereas, a quasi-municipal body,
because of its purely governmental function, was considered exempt from its operation. It
was suggested that the proposed amendment be changed to reflect this distinction. However,
it was not until after the original amendment had been declared unconstitutional that Congress
took heed of the suggestion. The distinction was argued in a brief submitted as amicus curiae
by nine Arkansas and Drainage Irrigation Districts in the Ashton case but ignored by the
Court. Statement by Mr. Frierson, Counsel for the Districts, HearingsBefore Sub-Committee of House Committee on the Judiciary, supra note 1io, at 87. See Black, op. cit. supra
.
note 125.
The importance of the distinction has been questioned in Legis. (1933) 33 COL. L. REv.
1oo,on the ground that municipal obligations are generally issued for governmental rather
than purely private functions. But see Note (1934) 34 COL. L. REv. 324. Because of the rapid
increase in proprietary functions municipal corporations are becoming "gigantic public service
corporations." On the other hand, see Wood, Constitutionality of the Suiners Municipal
Relief Bill (1934) io Am. BANYa. REv. 175, criticizing the distinction on the ground that both
types of units engage in proprietary functions. However, it has been suggested that "the
necessity of dealing with the financial structure supporting proprietary and governmental
functions, however defined, as a unit, might serve to justify an extension of the bankruptcy
power, if otherwise inapplicable, to the governmental operations of a municipality." Legis.
(1935) 35 COL. L. REv. 428, 430.

127. In re Cameron County Water Improvement Dist. No. I, 9 F. Supp. 103 (S.D. Tex.
1934), 83 U. OF PA. L. REv. 92o (1935); 1 MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (2d ed.
1928) § 135.
128. I DILLON, MU ICn1AI. CORPORATlONS (5th ed. 1911). "Municipal Corporations as
they exist in this country are bodies politic and corporate . . . established by the law
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In its governmental capacity it has been said to be a "political subdivision of
the State, created as a convenient agency, for the exercise of such of the
governmental powers of the State as may be entrusted to it",129 whereas
in its proprietary capacity it has been said to be "a body politic and corporate
constituted by the voluntary incorporation of the inhabitants . . . for the
purposes of local government thereof." 130
The proprietary capacity of municipal corporations has been recognized. 13 1 The Supreme Court decision in Vilas v. Manila 132 is illustrative.
In that case, when the Philippine Islands were ceded to the United States,
it was held that the Spanish municipality of Manila was not abolished by the
extinction of the sovereign creating it because a municipality, in its private or business capacity is a "mere legal entity or juristic person" standing
"for the community in the administration of local affairs wholly beyond
the sphere of the public purpose for which its governmental powers are
conferred." 133 However, Mr. Justice Butler, speaking for a unanimous
Court in Trenton v. New Jersey,'3 4 said:
"The basis of the distinction is difficult to state and there is no established rule for the determination of what belongs to the one or the
partly as an agency of the State to assist in the civil government of the county, but chiefly to
regulate and administer the local or internal affairs of the city, town, or district which is incorporated." Id. § 31. "This power of local government is the distinctive purpose and the
distinguishing feature of a municipal corporation proper." Id. § 32. Hunter v. Pittsburgh,
207 U. S. I6i (1907). Cf. Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U. S. 182 (1923).
129. Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U. S. 182, I85 (923).
I3O. I DILLON, op. cit. supra note 128, §31.
13r.Mount Hope Cemetery v. Boston, 158 Mass. 509, 33 N. E. 695 (0893) (state may
not take, without compensation, property which a municipality holds in a private or proprietary capacity). But cf. Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U. S. 182 (1923) (state may take property held by a municipality, without compensation, in the exercise of proper state functions).
Further examples of recognition of this capacity are: Workman v. New York City, 179 U.
S.552 (I9OO) ; Ex parte New York, 256 U. S. 490 (I92I) (libel in personam lies against a
municipality for a maritime tort, for which it is not liable under local law, although it does
not lie against a state) ; Hunter v. Pittsburgh, 207 U. S. I6I (907) (private property of a
municipality may be sold on execution). The most numerous illustrations are found in the
cases involving tort liability. Municipalities are generally held liable for torts committed by
their officers or agents in the exercise of what are deemed to be proprietary functions. See
cases cited in Trenton v. New Jersey, supra. However, the contrary is true in the exercise
of governmental functions. See Harris v. District of Columbia, 256 U. S. 65o (I92I) and
cases cited.
For additional discussion on this point, see Borchard, Government Liability in Tort
(924) 34 YALE L. J. I, 129, 229, (1926) 36 id. at I, 757, 1039, (1928) 28 COL. L.REV. 577,
734. See also Barnett, Foundations of Distinction Between Public and Private Functions
in Respect to the Common-Law Tort Liability of Municipal Corporations (1937) 16 Or. L.
REv. 250; Borchard, State and Municipal Liability in Tort-Proposed Statutory Reform
(1934) 2o A. B. A. J. 747; Borchard, Recent Statutory Developments in Municipal Liability
in Tort (1936) 2 LEGAL NoTms ON LocAL GOV'T 89; Bryan, The Nature of Governmental Functions (1914) I VA.L. REV. 497; Harno, Tort Immunity of Municipal Corporations (I921)
4 ILL. L. Q. 28; Schulz, The Effect of the Contract Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment
upon the Power of the States to Control Municipal Corporations (1938) 36 MIcH. L. Rzv.
385.
132. 220 U. S. 345 (I9ii).
133. Id. at 356.

134.

262 U. S. 182 (I9II).
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other class. It originated with the courts. Generally it is applied to
escape difficulties, in order that injustice may not result from the recognition of technical defenses based upon the governmental character
of such corporations." 135
Assuming the test of validity adopted by the majority in the Ashton
decision, i. e., the corporate nature of a petitioner, the proponents of the
second Act presumed 136 that this dual character of a municipality would
afford the Court an opportunity to hold the new Act constitutional as applied to municipalities, as well as to those local improvement districts which
are not declared by local law to be political subdivisions of a state or which
are not exercising state functions, without overruling the Ashton deci87

sion.1

Having in mind the inextricable confusion already wrought by what
may be termed the Jekyll-Hyde theorists in the field of municipal tort law

and in the field of federal taxation,

13 9

138

it is to be hoped that the finespun

191.

135.

Id. at

136.

See statements by Representative Wilcox, Hearings Before Sub-Committee of

House Committee on the Judiciary,supra note iio, at 31-33. Cf. Statement by George Bangs,
id. at 64 et seq. And see Black, op. cit. supra note 125; infra note 137.
It has been proposed that a federal municipal bankruptcy statute to be constitutional
and to overcome the Ashton decision would require actual state participation involving
examinations, determinations of capacity to pay and continuous supervision by a state administrative agency. Federal courts would intervene only to the extent of reviewing the actions of
the administrative agency, passing upon the equity of the plans and compelling acceptance by
minority creditors. Kilpatrick, Federal Regulation of Local Debt (1937) 26 NAT. MUNIc.
REV. 283, 288.
137. The distinction between the proprietary and governmental capacities of a municipality, as ventured by Special Assistant Attorney General Charles Weston, op. cit. supra note
126, was suggested merely as a basis on which the extension of the bankruptcy power to
municipalities might be sustained. However, his position appears to have been construed by
some to mean that the distinctions would justify the application of the bankruptcy power to
municipalities in their strict sense only. This interpretation presupposes that the test of
validity should be not only the corporate nature of a petitioner under the Act but also the
nature of the functions in connection with which the obligations affected by the proceedings
under the Act were incurred. See supra note iig.
That such a double-barrelled test would render the Act unworkable is self-evident. Likewise, by applying the distinction in this way, the corporate nature of a petitioner would appear to become immaterial, for, by analogy to the tax law, [see South Carolina v. United
States, 199 U. S. 437 (19o5) and Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U. S. 36o (1934)] it would follow
that the bankruptcy power should be applicable to political subdivisions and even to the states
in the exercise of proprietary functions. See statement by Mr. Satterfield, Counsel for R. F.
C., Hearings Before Sub-Committee of House Committee on the Judiciary, supra note iO,
at 49. Such an application of the distinction would carry the bankruptcy power beyond what
Mr. Weston deemed to be the pale of constitutionality, and would infringe upon the Ashton
decision.
138. See supra note 131.
139. The rule of McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (U. S. i8ig), has been interpreted by several decisions as clothing states and their instrumentalities with complete immunity from federal taxation. See United States v. Railroad Co., 17 Wall. 322, 327 (U. S.
1872) ; Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co., 157 U. S. 429, 584 (1895) ; Ambrosini v.
United States, 187 U. S. i, 7 (I9O2). But the trend of more recent decisions has been toward
a functional approach. Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U. S. 514 (1926) ; Willcuts v. Bunn,
282 U. S. 216 (1931) ; Brush v. Comm'r of Int. Rev., 57 Sup. Ct. 495 (937) ; cf. Helvering
v. Powers, 293 U. S. 214 (I934), 35 COL. L. REv. 3O (1935). See Developments in the
Law-Taxation (1934) 47 HARv. L. REv. 1209.
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Robert Louis Stevenson yarn will not be needed by the Supreme Court in
order to clothe the 1937 Municipal Bankruptcy Act with the cloak of constitutionality.
It is noteworthy that in the recent case of In Re Lindsay-Strathmore
4 0 the District Court for the Southern District of CaliIrrigationDistrict,'
fornia, in holding the second Municipal Bankruptcy Act unconstitutional,
discarded the tenuous distinction between governmental and proprietary
functions of civil and political units of a state to which the state has delegated broad powers, and those local agencies of a more limited scope.
The following observation of the court is pertinent:
a governmental body does not lose its character as such
merely because it may engage in activities of a proprietary nature. If
it is an agency of the state for the performance of certain functions,
the fact that the functions are limited does not alter its status. An
agency of the state for the performance of governmental functions it
still remains. Ultimately, the test is, Does it have the attributes of
sovereignty? Do its activities constitute a public as distinguished
from a private enterprise? In carrying out its functions, does it exercise that great prerogative which belongs to sovereignty only-the
power to tax and assess property within its boundaries for the upkeep
of its activities? If it does, then it is a state agency or instrumentality,
although it does not fit into any of the old rubrics under which governmental agencies were classified in less complex days-villages,
towns, cities, boroughs, and the like." 14Feeling bound by the Ashton decision, the court declared the second Act,
like the first, to constitute interference with state sovereignty.
However, if the minority opinion in the Ashton case should become
the majority decision when the validity of the new Act is tested before the
Supreme Court, the distinction between quasi-municipal corporations and
municipalities in the strict sense, and true governmental subdivisions would
not be needed. The criterion for the constitutionality of the Act would
appear to be whether it interferes substantially with, or burdens the exer1 42
cise of a state's sovereign powers over, the fiscal affairs of a municipality.
140. 21 F. Supp. 129 (S. D. Cal. 1937), 86 U. OF PA. L. REV. 310 (1938).
141. Id. at 132.

142. Dissenting in the Ashton case, Mr. Justice Cardozo said: "To read with the bankruptcy clause an exception or proviso to the effect that there shall be no disturbance of the
Federal framework by any bankruptcy proceeding is to do more than has been done already
with reference to the power of taxation known of all men." 298 U. S. 513, 538 (1936).
Assuming that the bankruptcy power, like the taxing power, yields to considerations of
state sovereignty, no reason is apparent why the bankruptcy power should not extend at least
to the limits of the doctrine of immunity as invoked in tax cases. There the strict view
regarding federal interference by the state instrumentalities, as distinguished from interference by the states with interstate commerce has been modified. See supra note 139. The
present judicial approach is more like that in interstate commerce cases. See (1933) 33 COL.
L. REv. 1075. "The principle . . . of the immunity of state instrumentalities from federal
taxation has its inherent limitations. It is a principle implied from the necessity of main-
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Applying this test, the Act does not appear to constitute an interference in
the constitutional sense with state sovereignty: the proceedings are voluntary; 143 there is no coercion upon municipalities eligible to participate under
the Act 144 unless the powers of a petitioning municipality to exert pressure
upon a minority of dissenting creditors can be called coercion; there can
be no impairment of the power of a state to control, by legislation or otherwise, any municipality in the exercise of its governmental powers; 145 and
federal courts cannot regulate or administer the fiscal affairs of the petitioning municipality, 1 46 for during the proceedings the courts are empowered to act merely to protect the best interests of all parties affected by a
reajdustment plan and to afford them the needed protection from each
other. 1 47 If the Act should be sustained on this basis as to municipalities,
it would appear to be valid as applied to other local taxing districts, regardless of their corporate nature or status.
The new Act not only gives the Supreme Court an opportunity to reconsider its opinion in the Ashton case; it also affords those sorely pressed
municipalities which were in the process of readjusting their debts under
taining our dual system of government. Springing from that necessity it does not extend
beyond it." Board of Trustees v. United States, 289 U. S. 48, 59 (1933), 33 COL. L. REv.
913.

It has been suggested, however, that the bankruptcy power, like the commerce, military
and currency powers, is plenary, Legis. (935) 35 COL. L. REv. 428, and that the taxing
power is the only power which must yield to state. sovereignty, (933) 33 COL. L. REv. 913,
914.
143. Pub. L. No. 302, 75th Cong., Ist Sess. (Aug. 16, 1937) § 83 (a). "Any petitioner
mnay file a petition hereunder stating . . . that it desires to effect a plan of composition of
its debts." (Italics supplied.) In the Ashton case, Mr. Justice Cardozo said: "The question
is not here whether the statute would be valid if it made provision for invohintary bankruptcy.
. For present purposes one may assume that there would be in such conditions a dislocation of that balance between the powers of the states and the powers of the central government which is essential to our federal system." (Italics supplied.) 298 U. S.513, 538 (1936).
144. See Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U. S.447, 482 (1932) ; cf. United States v. Butler, 297 U. S. 1 (1936) ; Legis. (935)

35 Co.

L. REv. 428.

The Act was drawn simply as

a composition bill to preclude any doubt that involuntary proceedings could be instituted
against a municipality thereunder. See statements by Representative Wilcox, HearingsBefore Sub-Committee of House Committee on the Judiciary, supra note io, at lOO-1O4.
145. Pub. L. No. 302, 75th Cong., ist Sess. (Aug. 16, 1937) § 83 (i).

"Nothing con-

146. Pub. L. No. 302, 75th Cong., ist Sess. (Aug. 16, 1937) § 83 (c).

.

tained in this chapter shall be construed to limit or impair the power of any State to control,
by legislation or otherwise, any municipality or any political subdivision of or in such State
in the exercise of its political or governmental powers, including expenditures therefor."
".

. the judge

shall not . . . interfere with (a) any of the political or governmental powers of
the petitioner; or (b) any of the property or revenues . . . necessary for essential governmental purposes; or (c)any income-producing property, unless the plan of composition
so provides." It has been suggested, with reference to the same provision in the first Act,
that Congress stepped beyond its constitutional power by adding the proviso: "unless the
plans of composition so provides." Legis. (935) 35 COL. L. REv. 428. But see supra note
145. And note that the scheme of the Act does not contemplate judicial supervision of the
execution of a confirmed plan of composition.
147. See statement by Representative Wilcox, on H. R. 5969, 75th Cong., ist Sess.
(1937), 77 CONG. REC., June 24, 1937, at 821o.
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the first Act an opportunity to complete the readjustment. In fact the lat148
ter has been stated as its immediate objective.
Parodoxically, this development of the federal-municipal relationship
to the point where the Federal Government extends to municipal corporations the right to reorganize in the same sense that it has extended this
right to overcapitalized railroads 149 and private corporations, 150 was provoked in a measure by the liberality with which the federal courts have
permitted mandamus 151 to be used by individual preference-seeking bondholders.
The cure for this mischief might be found upon a re-examination of
the powers and practices of the federal courts. Such a re-examination would
disclose that, although (i) the federal constitutional prohibition against
a law impairing the obligation of contracts 152 prevents a state from enacting a bankruptcy statute releasing a debtor from personal liability upon an
existing contract 153 and although (z) such a state bankruptcy statute might
be ineffective to release a debtor from obligations held by a non-resident
creditor not voluntarily submitting to the jurisdiction of the state court, 15
the way is open for state municipal insolvency acts and has been availed
of by some legislatures. 155 Such legislation, without threatening to invade
the reserved powers of the states, might be implemented by a federal statute
to prevent interference by the federal courts during the pendency of read148. See statement by Representative Chandler, id. at 8216: "It is only for the purpose
of completing the benefits of what Congress designated as an emergency measure, but before
much good could be accomplished, that measure was declared unconstitutional and this bill
is designed to complete the work."
149. 47 STAT. 1474 (1933), II U. S. C. A. §205 (1937).
15o. 48 STAT. 912 (1934), II U. S. C. A. §207 (1937).

151. The courts have made rigorous use of mandamus even where municipal solvency
was threatened thereby. Galena v. Amy, 5 Wall. 705 (U. S. 1866) ; Little Rock v. United
States, 103 Fed. 418 (C. C. A. 8th, igoo). See Note (1934) 43 YALE L. J. 924, 963-967 and
for cases showing that the same view was taken during the recent depression, id. at 967, n. 7.

Cf. Christmas v. Asbury Park, io F. Supp. 22 (D. N. J. 1935), cert. denied, 296 U. S. 624
(1935), 45 YALE L. J. 702 (1936) ; State v. St. Petersburg, 126 Fla. 233, 170 So. 730 (1936);
Sinking Fund Comm'rs v. Philadelphia, 324 Pa. 129, 188 Atl. 314 (1936).
152. U. S. CoNsT. Art. I, § io, cl. I.
153. Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 122 (U. S. 18i9); International Shoe Co. v.
Pinkus, 278 U. S. 261 (1929). But see infra note I55.
154. Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 212 (U. S. 1827). See Note (1934) 43 YALE L. J.
924, 968.
155. HILLHOUSE, op. cit. supra note 1O3, at 321-36o; SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE CoMmISSION REPORT, op. cit. supra note II0, at 113-1i6; Frye, State Receiverships of Insolvent
Municipal Corporations (1936) 25 NAT. MuNIc. REv. 319; Frye, loc. cit. supra note 103;
Stason, supra note 103, at 842 et seq.; Note (1934) 43 YALE L. J. 924, 979 et seq. Cf. Legis.

(1933) 46 HARv. L. REv. 1317; and see Dimock, Legal Problems of FinanciallyEmbarrassed
Municipalities (1936) 22 VA. L. REV. 39. But see Legis. (1933) 46 HAv. L. REV. 1317. State
legislation of this kind has been sustained in Hourigan v. North Bergen Twp., 113 N. J. L. 143,
172 Atl. 193 (1934); In re Title and Mortgage Guar. Co., 267 N. Y. 533, 196 N. E. 565
(934), 43 YALE L. J. OO7. But see Note (1936) 45 YALE L. J. 702, 704. Contra: Pryor
v. Goza, 172 Miss. 46, 159 So. 99 (935).
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justment proceedings undertaken in good faith by a distressed but honest
municipality under a state insolvency law. 15 6
The United States Housing Act of 1937
The most recent enactment bearing on federal-municipal relationships
is, of course, the United States Housing Act of I937,157 approved Septem-

ber I. This Act creates the United States Housing Authority as a corporation in perpetuity in the Department of the Interior,'58 the powers of the
corporation to be exercised by an administrator appointed by the President.159 The Authority is authorized to make loans to public housing agencies, such as states, counties, municipalities and local housing authorities,
for housing projects. These loans are to bear interest at a rate not less
than the going federal rate plus one-half of one percent, and are to mature
in not more than sixty years.' 6 0 The Act provides for two methods of
162
If
grants: (i) the annual contribution '61 and (2) the capital grant.
the annual contribution method is used, the loans outstanding on any one
project in which the United States Housing Authority participates may not
exceed ninety percent of the cost of the project; if the capital grant method
is used, the loan may not exceed the cost of the project less the grant, but
68
in no event may the loan exceed ninety percent of such cost.'

Under the first grant method, the annual contributions the Authority
may make to public housing agencies are limited to the amount necessary
to assure the low-rent character of a project and may not exceed a sum
equal to the annual yield at the going federal rate of interest, plus one percent, upon the cost of the project.164 The state or political subdivision in
which the project is situated must contribute at least twenty percent of the
annual federal contribution.' 65
Under the second grant method, in order to assure the low-rent character of a housing project, the Authority may donate not more than twentyfive percent of the cost of the project, 1 66 provided the state or political sub156. Such an Act, like federal municipal bankruptcy statutes, would serve to thwart
obdurate minorities.
Complementary national and state action has been suggested. HI.LHousE, op. cit. supra
note 103, at 351-360; Kilpatrick, FederalRegulation of Local Debt (1937) 26 NAT. MUTNIC.
REV. 283, 288; Note (1934) 43 YALE L. J. 924, OO5.
157. Pub. L. No. 412, 75th Cong., ist Sess. (Sept. 1, 1937), 42 U. S. C. A. § 14oi (Supp.
1937).
158. Id. §3 (a), 42 U. S. C. A. § 14o3 (a).
159. Id. §3 (b), 42 U. S. C. A. § 1403 (b).
i6o. Id. § 9, 42 U. S. C. A. § 1409.
161. Id. § io, 42 U. S. C. A. § 1410.
162. Id. § 11,42 U. S. C. A. § 1411.
163. Id. §9, 42 U. S. C. A. § 1409.
164. Id. § io (b), 42 U. S. C. A. § 1410 (b).
165. Id. §io (a), 42 U. S. C. A. §1410 (a).
166. Id. ii1 (b), 42 U S. C. A. §1411 (b).
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division in which the project is located contributes at least twenty percent
16
of such cost.'
Funds for grants are to be obtained from moneys available to the
Authority, except proceeds derived from the sale of its bonds.'
Funds for
loans are derived from the proceeds of bonds which the Authority is authorized to issue. 169 These bonds are to be guaranteed as to principal and interest by the United States. 17"
In at least one important respect the United States Housing Act of
1937 differs from the recent legislation affecting federal-non-federal relationships. The other statutes provided for cooperation with various kinds
of public bodies, but in housing the type of non-federal public body which
is primarily affected is the local housing atithority. 17 1 Largely as a result
of the suggestions of the Public Works Administration, there are now
thirty states where authorities may be created to participate in the benefits
of the United States Housing Act of 1937.172 Without the power to tax,
but with the power to undertake slum clearance and low-rent housing
projects financed with the aid of obligations payable from their income,
these authorities should prove themselves ideally suited as the appropriate
instrumentality to initiate, construct, finance and operate housing projects
for the benefit of families of low income.
In the only case where the constitutionality of a statute similar to a
state housing authority act has been raised, the Court of Appeals of Ken167. Id. § ii (f), 42 U. S. C. A. § I411 (f).
168. Id. §§ io (d), ii (c), 42 U. S. C. A. §§
i6g. Id. §2o (a), 42 U. S. C. A. §142o (a).
170. Id. §20 (c), 42 U. S. C. A. 142o (c).

I410 (d), 1411 (c).

171. For a discussion of the authority as an instrumentality for financing useful, revenueproducing improvements, see Foley, Low-Rent Housing and State Financing (1937) 85 U. OF1
PA. L. REv. 239, 253; Foley, Legal Aspects of Low-Rent Housing in New York (1937) 6
FouaAm L. Rav. i.
172. ALA. CODE (Supp. 1936) § 1297 (8) ; Ark. Acts 1937, no. 298, p. io74; Colo. Laws
1935, c. 131, 132, amended, Colo. Laws 1937, C. 171, 172; CONN. GEN. STAT. (Supp. 1937) C.
33c, §§ 139d-i6id; DEL. REv. CODE (935) c. i6o; Fla. Laws 1937, c. 17981; Ga. Laws 1937,

no. 411, p.

210;

Ill. Laws 3d Spec. Sess. 1933, no. 4, p. 159, amended, Ill. Laws 1937, no. 4o8-

410, pp. 676-688; Ind. Acts 1937, c. 207, p. 1034; Ky. STAT. ANN. (Carroll, 1936) § 2741a;
La. Acts 1936, no. 275, p. 697; MD. CODE ANN. (Flack, Supp. 1935) art. 78a, §§ 14-2o; Mass.
Acts 1935, c. 449, 485; Mich. Acts Extra Sess. 1933, no. 18, p. 46, amended, Mich. Acts 1935,
no. 8o, p. 132; MoNT. CODE ANN. (Anderson & McFarland, 1935) c. 404, §§ 5309.1-5309.36;
NEB. ComP. STAT. (Supp. 1935) §§ 14-1401 to 14-1416, amended, Neb. Laws 1937, c. 94, p.
327; N. J. Laws 1933, c. 444 (State Board only); N. Y. CoNSOL. LAWS (Cahill, Cum. Supp.
1931-1935) c. 67, §§ 60-78, p. 834; N. C. CODE ANN. (1935) c. 1o3a; N. D. Laws 1937, C.
102; Ohio Laws, 1933-1934, §§ 1078-29 to 1078-41, amended, OalIO CODE ANN. (Baldwin's
Throckmorton, 1934) §§ 1078-29 to 1078-41; Ore. Laws 1937, c. 442; PA. STAT. ANN. (Pur-

don, Supp. 1937) tit. 53, §§ 29oof-29oow, supplemented by PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp.
1937) tit. 35, § 1501 et seq., § 1541 et seq., § 1581 et seq.; R. I. Acts 1935, C. 2255, p. 161;
S. C. Acts 1934, no. 783, p. 1369, amended, S. C. Acts 1935, no. 301, p. 424 and no. 345, P.
58o, amended and supplemented by S. C. Acts 1937, no. 284, p. 431; TENN. CODE ANN.
(Michie, Supp. 1937) § 4406 (82) et seq.; TEXAS STAT. ANN. (Vernon, 1938) art. 1269k et
seq.; Vt. Laws 1937, no. 231, p. 284; W. VA. CODE ANN. (937)
§ 1409 (56) et seq.; Wis.
Laws 1935, c. 525, p. 900, amended, Wis. Laws Spec. Sess. 1937, c. 15, p. 77.
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tucky rendered a decision sustaining completely the validity of the Act. 173
This case decided (i) that the law related to one subject, (2) that an
authority (called a commisison in Kentucky) may exercise the power of
eminent domain (a power also recognized by the New York Court of Appeals 174), (3) that there is no delegation of legislative power, (4) that
the property and the bonds of the authority are tax exempt, (5) that the
debts of the authority are not debts of the state or of any political subdivision thereof, and (6) that a city can make an appropriation to an
authority to enable it to meet its preliminary functioning expenses.
If a proper degree of federal-municipal relationships is to be encouraged and continued, there must be an appraisal of the Housing Act in terms
of its ability to withstand attacks upon its constitutionality.
In the first place, if the constitutionality of the Act is to be assailed, a
prospective litigant must establish his right to sue. Although an analysis
of the legislative history of the Act discloses that, as originally introduced
in Congress, provision had been made for the construction of so-called
demonstration projects by the United States Housing Authority, this provision was deleted and no power to construct project now appears in
it.1 75

The removal of the provision for federally-constructed projects

also eliminated a possible assertion by a litigant of a "standing to sue", a
point which has sometimes been raised either because of the competition
made possible by the Act or because of increased taxation resulting from
its operation. As to the first ground, the Housing Act is analogous to the
Public Works Administration Acts recently sustained by the United States
Supreme Court on the theory that a private citizen has no standing in court
to complain against lawful competition.176 As to the second ground, the
fact that there is no federal construction authorized under the Act distin173. Spahn v. Stewart, 1O3 S. W. (2d) 651 (Ky. 1937).

174. New York City Housing Authority v. Muller, 270 N. Y. 333, 1 N. E. (2d) I53
(936).
175. As S. 1685, 75th Cong., Ist Sess. (i937) was introduced by Senator Wagner, § xi
was devoted to the development and acquisition of demonstration projects. Provisions for
demonstration projects were retained in the bill (§ 12) as it was reported out by the Senate
Committee on Education and Labor, SEN. RFP. No. 933, 75th Cong., ist Sess. (1937), but
were stricken out when the bill was debated in the Senate, 81 CONG. REc., Aug. 4, 1937, at
10541.

176. Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, 58 Sup. Ct. 300 (938).
Since such competition as there may be will not be by the United States Housing Authority but by the local public body which will only receive financial assistance from the United
States Housing Authority, the competition complained of can only be that arising from local
action pursuant to local law. To claim a "standing to sue" on this basis is to claim a right
to be free from competition, whereas the Alabama Power Company case is controlling to the
effect that it is not competition, but only unlawful competition, that is, competition accompanied by an invasion of legal rights, which gives rise to a "right to sue". See also Railroad
Company v. Ellerman, 1o5 U. S. I66 (1881) ; Edward Hines Trustees v. United States, 263
U. S. 143 (1923) ; Sprunt & Son v. United States, 281 U. S. 249 (930) ; United States ex
rel. New York Warehouse v. Dern, 68 F. (2d) 773 (App. D. C. 1934), cert. denied, 292 U. S.
642 (I933) ; Franklin v. Tugwell, 85 F. (2d) 208 (App. D. C. 1936).

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

guishes it from the Resettlement case. 177 The standing in court which the
local taxpayer was found to have in that case arose from the fact that local
tax burdens would be increased as a result of the exemption of federal property from taxation. Any attempt to claim an interest as a federal taxpayer
would, of course, be defeated by the principles laid down in Frothingham
1 78

v. Mellon.

Notwithstanding that it would appear that no potential litigant could
challenge the constitutionality of the United States Housing Act, the applicability to the Act of points raised in other cases to challenge the constitutionality of other federal statutes deserves consideration.
The question of delegation of legislative power to an administrative
officer has been frequently raised in such cases in recent years. The United
States Housing Act of 1937, however, is replete with standards governing its administration. A mere cataloguing of these standards, which Congress imposed to bind the discretion of the Administrator, ought to put at
rest any contention that legislative power has been improperly delegated:
viz., the definition of low-rent housing and of families of low income; 179
the limitation on the types and amounts of the subsidy which may be
made 180 and the provisions which must be inserted in the annual grant
contracts; 181 the limit on the loans which may be made on any one project 182 and on the amount which may be expended in any one state; 183
the requirement that the Authority shall dispose by lease or sale of the federal projects transferred to it as soon as possible; 184 the provisions with
reference to the maximum cost per room and per family unit 18 5 and the
provisions setting up standards relating to labor.',
As to the argument that the Act may violate the Tenth Amendment
because it invades the reserved rights of the states, the discussion on this
point in connection with the Public Works Administration is equally applicable. 187 There is not the slightest interference with the rights of the
states or their subdivisions. In fact, it is this very point which makes the
Housing Act such a significant development in federal-municipal relation177. Franklin v. Tugwell, 85 F. (2d) 2o8 (App. D. C. 1936) (suit brought to enjoin
the expenditure of federal funds for the purchase of lands for a resettlement project).
178. 262 U. S. 447 (1923).
179. Pub. L. No. 412, 75th Cong., Ist Sess. (Sept. I, 1937) §2 (I), 42 U. S. C. A.
§ 1402 (I) (Supp. 1937).
i8o. Id. §§O, 1, 42 U. S. C. A. §§ 41O, 141.
181. Id. §§ io (c), 15 (3), (4) and (5), I6 (2), 42 U. S. C. A. §§ 141o (c), 1415 (3),

(4) and (5), 1416
182. Id.

§ 9,

(2).
42 U.

S. C. A. § 14o9.

183. Id. §21 (d), 42 U. S. C. A. §21 (d).
184. Id. § 12 (b), 42 U. S. C. A. § 1412 (b).
185. Id. § 15 (5), 42 U. S. C. A. § 1415 (5).
186. Id. § 16, 42 U. S. C. A. § 1416.
187. Supra, pp. 496-501.
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ships. It combines local sponsorship with federal financial assistance in
a manner which should prove a model for future legislation. An enumeration of some of the instances will show how scrupulous Congress has been
in preserving in proper balance this relationship.
In the first place, the recipients of federal financial assistance are public
bodies which under state law are authorized to engage in the development
or administration of low-rent housing or slum clearance.""' Provisions
originally appearing in the bill relating to loans to limited dividend companies 189 and leases to cooperatives 190 were eliminated.

Secondly, a project is initiated, constructed, financed and operated by
the public housing agency in accordance with and pursuant to state law,
and the public body in which the authority operates is required to make a
local contribution to the project if it wishes federal assistance.1 ,In the third place, any contracts for loans, annual contributions, capital
grants, sale or lease, must contain a provision that all architects, technical
engineers, draftsmen, technicians, laborers and mechanics employed in the
development or administration of a project must be paid wages prevailing
in the locality as determined by local law. 9 '
And, finally, the Act provides: -93
"The acquisition by the Authority of any real property pursuant to
this Act shall not deprive any State or political subdivision thereof of
its civil and criminal jurisdiction in and over such property, or impair
the civil rights under the State or local law of the inhabitants on such
property; and, insofar as any such jurisdiction may have been taken
away or any such rights impaired by reason of the acquisition of any
property transferred to the Authority pursuant to section 4(d), such
jurisdiction and such rights are hereby fully restored."
An additional argument raised against the constitutionality of Federal Acts relates to the general welfare clause. The power to spend for the
94 is, of
general welfare, made clear by the decision in the Butler case,'
188. Pub. L. No. 412, 75th Cong., ist Sess. (Sept. I, 1937) § 2 (11), 42 U. S. C. A.
(Supp. 1937).
i8g. Loans to limited-profit housing agencies were authorized by § io of S. 1685, 75th

§2 (11)

Cong., Ist Sess. (1937), as introduced by Senator Wagner. This clause was retained in the
bill as it was reported by the Senate Committee on Education and Labor, Sasr. REP. No. 933,
75th Cong., ist Sess. (937) §9 (b), but was stricken out when the bill was debated on the
floor of the Senate, 81 CONG. RFc., Aug. 3, 1937, at 10480.
i9o. Leases of demonstration projects to cooperatives were authorized by § ii (d)of S.
1685, 75th Cong.,

1st

Sess. (1937), as introduced by Senator Wagner. This provision was

retained in the bill as it was reported, SEN. REP. No. 933, 75th Cong., Ist Sess. (1937)
§ 12 (d), by the Senate Committee on Education and Labor, but was stricken out when the
bill was debated on the floor of the Senate, 81 CONG. REc., Aug. 3, 1937, at 10480.
191. Pub. L. No. 412, 75th Cong., Ist Sess. (Sept. I, 1937) §§ io(a), ii (f), 42 U. S.
C. A. §§ 1410 (a), 1411 (f) (Supp. 1937).
192. Id. § 16 (2), 42 U. S. C. A.§ 1416 (2).
193. Id. § 13 (b), 42 U. S. C. A. §1413 (b).
194. United States v. Butler, 297 U. S. I (1936).
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course, not without limitations. One of these limitations, as pointed out
in that case, is the Tenth Amendment. It is clear, however, that there is
no "scheme" 195 in the Housing Act which could conceivably be condemned
as an attempt to purchase compliance with federal law in violation of a
right reserved to the states. In its declaration of policy, 196 in its provisions
for financial assistance for the construction of safe and sanitary dwellings, 197
in its attention to slum clearance 198 and in its references to the relief of
unemployment, 19 9 the Act should meet successfully attacks based on its
alleged violation of the general welfare clause.
Conclusion
From this attempt, in a broad general way, to outline the recent developments in the field of federal-municipal relationships, it is obvious
that the extent of such relationships today resembles nothing that obtained
in this field prior to 1932. These developments are different in principle
from the familiar grants-in-aid to the states, and they are different in fact
and in practice from the much less familiar federal services to municipalities. The past five years have witnessed the elimination of the states as
the "middle-man" in negotiations between the Federal Government and
local governmental units. This has been due to a variety of causes: viz.,
to the straitened financial burdens of the cities which the states, similarly
straitened, were unable to relieve; to the gradual economic expansion of
state lines; to a growing consciousness that a citizen of a municipality is
no less a citizen of the United States and entitled to benefits which his own
state may be unable or unwilling to provide; and finally, to a growing independence on the part of cities from their states.
Only time can tell to what extent this changing relationship is desirable. Through enabling, exemptive and preferential legislation, Congress
has acted toward the cities and other public bodies in a new and significant
manner. A fair appraisal of this changed attitude must await solutions
to legal, political, economic and social problems which will continue to
arise.
195. Id. at

72.

I96. Pub. L. No. 412, 75th Cong., ist Sess. (Sept. I, 1937) § I, 42 U. S. C. A. § (Supp.
1937).
197. Id. § 9, io, ii, 42 U. S. C. A. §§ i4o9, 1410, 141.
198. Id. §§io (a), ii (a), 42 U. S. C. A. §§ 1410 (a), 1411 (a).
i99. Id. §§ i, ii (e), 12 (a), i6 (6), 42 U. S. C. A. §§ I4OI, 14"1 (e), 1412 (a), 1416 (6).

